

Marine Samaritans: The Role of Police Constabulary Forces In Complex Contingency Operations

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**MARINE SAMARITANS:
THE ROLE OF POLICE CONSTABULARY FORCES
IN
COMPLEX CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS**

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Research Paper submitted to Dr. R. L. DiNardo
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ABSTRACT

TITLE OF THESIS: Marine Samaritans: The Role of Police Constabulary
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The international environment in the 21st century may be characterized by increasing crises and conflicts where instability will become the primary threat to security. Regardless of the specific nature of the future threat the United States must retain the capability to counter any threat across the entire spectrum of conflict, whether disaster relief or full scale war. The current National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement clearly defines a role for the U.S. military participating in complex contingencies such as humanitarian and peacekeeping operations in addition to its role of deterring aggression and winning the nation's wars. The challenge for the United States is to organize its armed forces with the requisite capabilities and force structure to meet future security concerns.

The common thread in complex contingencies is one characterized by an unstable environment. Increased population growth, failing economic systems and environmental degradation are only a few of the root causes which threaten stability. The presence of these destabilizing factors will undoubtedly create complex contingencies which may require United States intervention. The symptoms of this instability are exhibited by communal violence where civil conflict is often rooted in traditional ethnic, tribal and religious animosities.

Atrocities ensue where chaos overshadows civil rule and order. The end result is a monumental crisis in the social order in which the social and political fabric of a society become unraveled. Good intentions from nation's willing to intervene often fall short in providing an appropriate and timely response. Military forces, including those under United Nation's auspices, often lack the security and intelligence expertise to establish and maintain order to create conditions necessary for conflict resolution. Conventional combat forces are often tasked to perform functions which they are neither equipped nor trained to do, and often do not possess the political will to achieve a permanent solution. If the U.S. Marine Corps is to maintain - "a certain force for an uncertain world" and remain the nation's force of choice then changes in force structure and capabilities will be required. Military force intervention based on a police constabulary concept would provide the Marine Total Force structure the greatest utility in managing complex contingency operations.

The police constabulary concept eliminates the distinction between the peacetime and the wartime military establishment. It derives its roots from the basic need of any civilized society to maintain some semblance of law and order so that society can function as a legitimate entity in the eyes of its citizenry. The Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) concept is conducive to organizing a force from within the existing Marine Corps force structure and tailoring it to meet the specific requirements necessary to participate in complex contingencies. When combined with combat support and combat service support and other various attachments the Marine infantry regiment remains the most flexible task organization capable of adapting to the requirements of operations other than war. The mission of the Marine Forces Reserve is to augment and reinforce the active component. The reserve is uniquely qualified to participate in peace operations and have proven instrumental in reducing the high operational and personnel tempo experienced by many active component units. Designating a specific regiment within the Selected Marine Corps Reserve and organizing, training and equipping the regiment accordingly, will enhance U.S. force participation in operations other than war.

The battlefield of the 21st century may be significantly more challenging than the one we face today. Being prepared for tomorrow's conflict does not necessarily mean a nation's military possesses the ability to meet the challenge presented the day after tomorrow. Failure to prepare the Marine Corps for the threats posed by the latter may provide the nation with a hollow capability in meeting the demands of the 21st century. Whether the United States will be confronted with an asymmetrical or conventional battlefield in the future is unclear, however, a major social reorganization of the international community is perceived which will likely produce increased crises and conflicts where instability will become the primary threat to security.¹ In order to address these future challenges, likely threat contingencies must be anticipated, and the appropriate military capabilities identified which will be required to sustain the Marine Corps' Total Force structure for the future century.

General Charles C. Krulak, Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps presented his vision of the battlefield of the 21st century as one encompassing humanitarian, peacekeeping and mid intensity conflict, all occurring almost simultaneously within the same battlespace.

"Our enemies will not allow us to fight the Son of Desert Storm, but will try to draw us into the stepchild of Chechnya. In one moment in time, our service members will be feeding and clothing displaced refugees - providing humanitarian assistance. In the next moment they will be holding two warring tribes apart - conducting peacekeeping operations, - finally, they will be fighting a highly lethal mid-intensity battle - all on the same day. It will be what we call the 'three block war'.²

The United States has already experienced elements of this 'three block war' in this decade alone. If this is a foreshadow of what is to come in increasing occurrence then perhaps the Commandant's future war model should be used as a point of departure in determining the future composition And capability of the Marine Corps.

There is discussion, often controversial in nature, in both political and military circles as to whether the U.S. military should become involved in complex contingencies³ such as humanitarian, disaster relief and peacekeeping missions. Will Rogers once remarked "that nothing is more dangerous than an expert off his discipline".⁴ Whether there is a degree of truth which pertains to the military in this case can certainly be debated and should be debated for all intent and purposes. Many arguments have been made that portray participation in complex contingencies as being detrimental to the welfare of our military service and ultimately our nation. Congressional partisan attacks claim that these types of missions substantially degrade combat readiness, often diverting scarce budgetary resources away from already lean operation and maintenance accounts. In addition, the verdict is still out as to whether the conventional warfighting ethos is compatible with the 'nurturing' skills required for the relief and development associated with complex contingencies.⁵ Regardless of how the debate is settled the U.S. military for the time being has already been issued a fait accompli. The current National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement clearly defines a role for the U.S. military participating in complex contingencies such as humanitarian and peacekeeping operations in addition to its role of deterring aggression and winning the nation's wars.

During the Persian Gulf War the U.S. relied on overwhelming military force to attain success. This precedent was again utilized during operations in Somalia, Haiti and in the former Yugoslavia. In Somalia, what began as a humanitarian relief operation in a complex emergency transitioned to one of peace enforcement and nation building. U.S. participation was sharply curtailed when on one single day in Mogadishu U.S. Special Forces sustained 18 killed and over 70 personnel wounded when an operation went awry. Perhaps an even more painful reminder of the costs associated with participating in complex contingencies was during peacekeeping operations in Lebanon. Over 240 U.S. servicemen were killed when the barracks they were billeted in was destroyed by a massive explosion caused by a terrorist truck bomb. These politically alluring operations are extremely deceiving and often escalate in intensity from a seemingly benign environment to one of extreme volatility and hostility.⁶ Before the United States can extract itself politically and militarily from this operational 'spider web' the trap has already been sprung. Whether the results are loss of lives or loss of international credibility the costs remain high. Complex contingencies can be extremely sophisticated and perhaps require more than just an overwhelming conventional military response. If the current National Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement is to be carried forward into the 21st century then a comprehensive understanding of complex contingencies must be undertaken. This may entail amending current strategy and/or adapting U.S. military capabilities to meet the threat.

Identifying the underlying cause of a respective complex contingency is paramount in applying the appropriate strategy and force composition in the attempt to remedy the problem. Because of the 'CNN effect' emotion rather than

critical, rational analysis can often be the catalyst which initiates military intervention. As in Somalia, the American public was roused to action by scenes on television of starving, malnourished children. The argument to intervene was made even more convincing when the situation in Somalia was broadcast real time into the homes of millions of Americans during the Christmas holiday season. The administration directed military intervention into Somalia on humanitarian grounds in December 1992. The initial intervention was successful but as the contingency unfolded so did the mission. Did the United States accurately identify the root cause(s) of the problem in Somalia, and just as important, was the correct strategy adopted to remedy these causes? The result of misdiagnosis may mean mission creep for U.S. forces whereby the nation may become entangled in a contingency which it is incapable of managing effectively. Therefore, decision makers at the national level must conduct a thorough mission analysis in order to attempt to identify the underlying cause or causes of the complex contingency. However, even an accurate appraisal of the causal factors will not guarantee success. More importantly, the intervening nation(s) must have agile military forces capable of adjusting to a changing mission and certainly the nation must possess the political will to stay the course.

Complex contingencies often exhibit common characteristics in background development and eventual evolution of the conflict. In this decade alone the international community has witnessed a multitude of complex contingencies ranging from humanitarian operations in Somalia to peace enforcement in the former Yugoslavia. Certainly each and every contingency is

unique in its own right often exhibiting several characteristics associated with an underlying cause. Civil conflict, however, precipitates many of these contingencies. Complex contingencies are fueled by ethnic, tribal and religious animosities and often result in widespread atrocities. The former Yugoslavia and certainly countries such as Somalia, Rwanda and Burundi provide ample evidence of this type of violent behavior.

In Somalia, the world watched a nation state completely disintegrate almost overnight until not a single vestige of national government was present. The population was stripped bare of all basic public services adding to the chaos which followed. In situations like these political control becomes scattered among many regional power centers. With the central government absent the general population is often left with tribal leadership at the village level. Many of these conflicts experience massive population shifts to escape atrocities and search for scarce food resources. This results in uncontrollable surges in refugee migration further increasing famine and disease. Rwanda and Burundi are cases in point. As the eroding nation states fall deeper into the precipices of chaos the countries begin to suffer virtual economic collapse. Economic markets at all levels begin to disappear with hyperinflation becoming rampant, rapid devaluation of currency and a gross national product rapidly spiraling downwards. The result of all these factors produces a horrific upheaval in the existing order of society. However, there does run a common thread throughout the majority of these conflicts, it is pervasive divisiveness delineated by communal violence.⁷

Communal violence and its debilitating effect on society is viewed as the precursor for much of the strife associated with complex contingencies. Fear

and despair grip the general populace as fundamental law and order breaks down. This leads to massive societal stress which tears at the very fragile political and social fabric of the society. This dilemma will be exacerbated by the prediction that by 2010 it is expected that over 70 percent of the world's population will live in urban areas.⁸ This will create even greater challenges concerning law and order issues and the control of communal violence among and between communities. An outside observer has a legitimate concern when the question is asked whether a participating nation or international organization truly understands the very real nature of the relief strategy when it is so very often predicated on a false causal analysis. Andrew Natsios, a former director of the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, contends that perhaps the world's leadership are confusing "logistics and security as ends in themselves when they are a means toward a larger goal of returning normalcy to traumatized societies".⁹

Perhaps more than just possessing traditional military combat skills is required for missions such as peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Military intellectuals have argued that the military should perform tasks which they are equipped and trained to do. The U.S. military presently does not formally train a specific unit in its arsenal in accordance with a prescribed peacekeeping, peace enforcement doctrine. As a result the United States relies on the professionalism of its forces to accomplish any assigned mission, whether warfighting or otherwise. The unofficial motto of the U.N. soldier is 'Peacekeeping is not a soldier's job, but only a soldier can do it'. Charles Moskos, a military sociologist, contends that when the average combat soldier

is able to reconcile soldierly honor with the peacekeeping task the relative distinction between the role of the war fighter vis a vis the peacekeeper is significantly diminished. However, the real issue at hand is whether peacekeeping standards would adversely affect the warfighting capability of the U.S. military force?

A paradox certainly exists as to whether standard combat forces provide the greatest utility in conducting peace operations. Presently, there is historical data to support both arguments. Even with all the lessons combined with historical hindsight the jury will remain out on this issue for the foreseeable future. Since the U.S. has no formal standing peacekeeping force, nor does the U.S. train specifically for that mission, the U.S. will continue to plod along and prescribe overwhelming combat power in a complex contingency. A recent example of this was the initial deployment of elements of the First Armored Division to the former Yugoslavia. The irony of the situation was that no major armor threat opposed the intervention force. No one will argue that the division has not done a superb job in the role of peace enforcement, but the real issue that should be publicly debated is what opportunity costs are incurred by having first line combat troops deployed in such situations?

Capturing the many costs associated with participating in complex contingencies has proven elusive. Keeping track of military outlays for peacekeeping ventures would seem a relatively simple and straightforward process. However, even this accounting method becomes complicated when the separate services have been paying for these types of operations 'out of hide' robbing their own operation and maintenance accounts to pay the cost of

such involvement. In order to recoup the price of admission for peace operations, the Department of Defense via the Administration must submit a supplemental request to Congress. Unfortunately, due to partisan politics supplementals often fall short in covering expenditures or are unduly delayed sometimes being approved several months after the fact. The aforementioned are only costs which can be reasonably quantified, but what about the opportunity costs which can not be captured by the military comptroller. These are the hidden costs which invariably are eaten by the individual service(s) much to their detriment.

Participation in complex contingencies also incurs costs which have previously been difficult to quantify but indirectly tend to significantly impact the force. The ability to equate peacekeeping participation with a reduced wartime capability for conventional combat forces is inconclusive. However, further study is required to determine what impact if any will increased personnel and operational tempos associated with participation in peace operations have on the military culture. Specifically, will the increased tempo adversely affect the families of those servicemen and women who participate in these type of operations? Does the tempo of operations negatively affect the Marine Corps' attrition rate? What effect do these type of operations have on the Marine Corps' recruiting effort? What impact does a failed mission like Somalia have on civil-military relations? Can failure produce a huge loss in international prestige and credibility for the United States? By not participating in a complex contingency when our leadership is warranted, does that correspond to a loss of goodwill in the international community? What political costs are incurred when selected reserve and national guard units are

activated to support peace operations? Often it is the medical and logistical support branches which are the supported units in a complex contingency and the combat elements assume the supporting role. How would this impact the U.S. Army when the preponderance of their combat support is relegated to reserve and national guard units? There are many more questions which should be asked and are certainly worth pursuing in a public forum. These issues become even more important with a declining military budget and a U.S. debt of well over five trillion dollars. The challenge still remains to devise a suitable force structure which will minimize the opportunity costs associated with complex contingencies.

The current U.S. force structure and military ethos of its service members may not provide the greatest utility to the nation in combating the threats envisioned in the 21st century. The current ethos of the U.S. Marine Corps is combat intensive and offensive minded. It is clearly a warfighting ethos that is reflected in the Marine Corps' recruiting effort, recruit training syllabus and is certainly evident in the structure and capabilities present within the division and aviation wing units in the Fleet Marine Forces. However, is the Marine Corps current ethos and force structure relevant for the 'three block war' envisioned by General Krulak in the 21st century? Will the Marine Corps be capable of fighting the stepchild of Chechnya or will it be relegated to only maintaining the capability to defeat the son of Desert Storm, a threat which does not currently exist. Perhaps General Krulak would never admit to being a visionary but the warfighting model he envisions is best stated in his own words. The three block war will occur "in an environment where conventional doctrine and organization may mean very little".¹⁰ What ethos and potential force structure would the

Marine Corps require to successfully compete against the threat envisioned by the Commandant of the Marine Corps?

The ethos associated with conducting conventional war is often contrary to the mind set required of the soldier to perform non-conventional missions such as peacekeeping. Charles Moskos defines a peacekeeping force:

"Military components from various nations, operating under the command of an impartial world body and committed to the absolute minimal use of force, which seek to reduce or prevent armed hostilities".¹¹

The key phrase in this definition is 'absolute minimum use of force'. Moskos further narrows his definition by stating that peacekeeping requires a degree of noncoercion and impartiality on behalf of the peacekeeper in adhering to the principle of using the absolute minimum use of force.¹² These elements of peacekeeping certainly create a paradox between peacekeeping and conventional warfighting forces where maximum violence is sought to defeat the enemy. It appears that peacekeeping runs counter to the traditional grain of military behavior. Does the conventionally trained Marine or soldier encounter any difficulty in adjusting to peacekeeping even when as a peacekeeper he is charged with maintaining peace even to the detriment of military considerations? Moskos contends that the gap between peace theory and practice can be bridged by the prior training of its soldiers in peacekeeping skills.¹³ As warfare evolves, at least according to the battlefield envisioned in the future, should the ethos of our service culture also evolve and adapt with the

potential changing characteristic of war? To prepare our forces for the battlefield of the 21st century it might prove to the nation's advantage to nurture the Marine Corps' current ethos in order to facilitate the development of the constabulary ethic.

The constabulary ethic may provide tremendous leverage to U.S. military forces when managing complex contingencies. Moskos views the peacekeeper, as contrasted with the conventional soldier - the extreme ramification of the constabulary ethic. In this case the peacekeeper in the constabulary mold "... favors persuasion over punishment, compromise over capitulation, and perseverance over conquest".¹⁴ Current training of combat troops seek to socialize the concept of violence and the use of lethality to accomplish its ends. Victory for the traditional soldier is critical to his military ethos. Peacekeeping on the other hand attempts to resolve conflicts before they turn violent. Peacekeeping has a positive aim of improving the relations between the two parties in conflict so as to restore the possibility that a practical settlement may be found.¹⁵ Essentially " the constabulary force concept eliminated distinction between the peacetime and the war time military establishment, it draws on the police concept".¹⁶

The police concept of managing complex contingencies is certainly not a recent phenomenon but instead derives its roots from the basic need of any civilized society to maintain some semblance of law and order so that society can function as a legitimate entity in the eyes of its citizenry. However, the application of the police force concept is ever evolving in concept and design. Many nations today maintain paramilitary or national security forces but very few have established doctrine for their use in complex contingencies outside of

their own national borders. The underlying tenets of the police concept are to exhibit the minimal force necessary, contain violence and to preserve the public order.¹⁷ Many people at first glance will equate these tenets with those of the peace soldier. However, unlike the peace soldier model which resorts to force only in self defense, the police concept model allows for measured if minimal force to achieve political ends.¹⁸ In addition, police forces have very different roles, functions and philosophies than the army. These distinct differences between the two should be clearly delineated so as not to confuse the nature of their respective capabilities.¹⁹

The use of police forces would provide the greatest utility during the preventive deterrence and in the post conflict stage of complex contingencies. This is not to say that the role of the police forces would be minimized during the other stages of a conflict. Should preventive deterrence fail and the conflict escalate beyond the control of the police forces then the police role might have to assume a supporting role as conventional combat troops take the lead in deescalating the crisis.

Andrew Natsios contends that military force does not have to be used more frequently but perhaps more wisely. "It needs to be more thoughtful, timely, and strategic".²⁰ Communal violence, sequentially is normally the first characteristic symptom to develop in an unfolding complex contingency. Timing of intervention by outside organizations thus becomes crucial. All too often the U.S. has intervened with significant military force both as a first and a last resort. This strategy could be perceived as an inefficient use of force. If the U.S. desires to at least be an actor, much less a leader, on the international stage

then perhaps it needs to reevaluate its national policy on preventive deterrence. It appears at times that the deployment of U.S. military forces are determined more so by political agendas than by prudent policy. Many complex contingencies can be prevented or at least the volatility of the conflict retarded if a police element of the nation's arsenal could intervene in a timely manner. The earlier a police force is inserted into a crisis the easier it is to prevent the cycles of retribution and violence from growing out of control. Having a force trained, equipped, organized and capable of performing a police function would give the U.S. another tool to utilize from its kit bag in order to deal effectively with complex contingencies. Possessing this capability would give the U.S. an increased flexible response to deter future crises from escalating into major complex contingencies. It would be America's first line of defense and not necessarily the nation's last and only choice of resort. Former Defense Secretary William F. Perry stated:

"In the post Cold War security environment, U.S. strategy for managing conflict rests on three basic lines of defense. The first line of defense is to prevent threats from emerging; the second is to deter threats that do emerge; and the third, if prevention and deterrence fail, is to defeat the threat using military force. Today the United States has a unique historical opportunity to foster peace through preventive defense" ²¹

The British model of 'police primacy' could be adapted for American use as an effective model in successfully managing complex contingencies. This

model was derived from years of British experience in handling crisis in Northern Ireland, Palestine, Malaya, Aden, Kenya and Cyprus. As a result of these experiences the British have gained valuable insight into effective methods of counter-insurgency, counter- terrorism and peacekeeping. These ventures have led them to a policy which lends itself to a joint commitment and determination of the police and armed forces. The British, however, are not naive in thinking that these two elements alone guarantee success in managing a complex contingency. Their experiences determined that the police and army need to be complimented by a wide range of measures across government to help undercut the underlying causes associated with complex contingencies.²² Essentially, 'police primacy' in the British model stresses that the army is in support of the police. They firmly believe that the ultimate aim of any intervention must be the restoration of 'police primacy'. Historical precedence has helped validate this operational concept.

The British have been involved in police security operations beginning as early as 1830 in Ireland. However, it was not until 1919 that British counter-insurgency and counter-terrorist policy began to function with the police as the prime source of response and the military as an adjunct.²³ In regard to strategy for these types of operations the British had none even by the commencement of operations in Cyprus in 1955. Essentially, operations were conducted based on a collection of established principles that gradually evolved from successive past war campaigns.²⁴ What was even more limiting to their efforts was the fact that all the hard lessons learned were never incorporated into their training. Irregardless of their strategy, or lack thereof, the British believed that successful

policing operations were wedded to the maintenance of an effective link with and support of the people as well as an association with the law.

The ultimate aim of police security operations was service to the general public rather than through the use of force in hopes to gain the goodwill and support of the general populace. The police provided a graduated response which could perhaps delay the deployment of combat troops.²⁵ In essence, they would form the first line of defense. The British also learned that every complex contingency is different, each one having its own distinct personality. What was effective in Britain's colonial empire in Malaya (rural urban insurgency) did not necessarily translate into an effective urban based strategy as experienced in Palestine, Cyprus and Aden.²⁶ Many of the principles applied in Malaya were found to be counter productive. The concept of 'police primacy', however, remains sound. Recent U.S. operational experience in managing complex contingencies has demonstrated a need to reevaluate its application of force in such contingencies. Policing functions outside the role of the military police may provide a unique capability to U.S. intervention policy.

United States involvement in Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda and in the former Yugoslavia have witnessed a host of non-government organizations (NGOs), international organizations (IOs), etc. participating in these complex contingencies. The presence of these organizations are more often than not a welcomed sight to a country ravaged by internal conflict and economic strife. However, if these organizations are to adequately perform their primary task of relief and development they must be capable of operating in somewhat of a stable and relatively secure environment. When an interventionist nation

(acting unilaterally or multilaterally) invokes the security function the ultimate aim of the military ought to be to protect noncombatants and the relief operations which support their own operations.²⁷ What the United States is finding is that perhaps the current force structure, specifically military police functions do not provide the necessary security requirements to effectively support complex contingency operations. Although current military police units, especially in the U.S. Marine Corps, have limited tactical offensive capability, Charles Moskos contends that these units are typically tasked to perform duties of policing other military units, thereby making them ineffective in peacekeeping between warring factions.²⁹ A civilian populace wracked by conflict might also perceive them as purveyors of maximum violence, no different than regular combat units participating in a security function.

Military force intervention based on a police concept would provide the Marine Total Force structure the greatest utility in managing complex contingency operations. A portion of the Marine Corps, perhaps a reserve infantry regiment should refocus its composition and capabilities drawing upon the police concept in order to assist in effectively managing complex contingencies. The potential utility achieved by developing a force along police lines of responsibilities would provide the Marine Corps and the nation with the increased capability to provide the correct forces which could more readily deploy for discretionary interventions. This 'third force' would be trained, equipped, and organized to operate in a variety of complex contingency environments. In addition, its mission would not be dominated by the minimum/maximum force argument inherent in the use of police or military.

Lastly, the availability of such a force would reduce the need to involve the nation with all ensuing political and propaganda costs normally associated with intervention by a conventional military combat force. In order to effect this reorganization it would prove beneficial to look to the French national police model, the Gendarmerie Nationale, Carabinieri in Italy and the Royal Marechaussee of the Netherlands for some effective organizations to model U.S. forces after.

National police forces, or paramilitary forces, as they are commonly referred to in foreign countries, have performed critical roles in maintaining public order, containing organized crime and have been instrumental in combating domestic and international terrorism. The Gendarmerie Nationale and the Carabinieri are both under control of The Minister of the Interior in their respective countries. They are primarily used for internal security operations, however, they maintain close cooperation with their respective national armies. Often, these paramilitary organizations augment regular army units with military police and in a wartime role these units would be integrated into the Army's order of battle. Equipment lists for these two paramilitary forces are similar, their equipment assets include: light tanks; APCs; armored vehicles; light attack and observation helicopters; riverine patrol craft; and heavy weapons, to include crew served and infantry mortars. They maintain a military structure and ethos for the most part, thereby making augmentation of the regular military more effective in time of national crisis. Besides these two paramilitary forces there exists the Royal Marechaussee of the Netherlands. This organization is a paramilitary force which combines a military outlook with police skills, and has

achieved international cooperation through participation in various peace operations.

The Royal Marechaussee is a police organization with a military status. It is an independent service and forms part of the Ministry of Defense. Tasks include civil and military responsibilities. Civil tasks provide internal security and general policing roles, while military tasks encompass carrying out police tasks for the Dutch armed forces as well as for foreign armed forces and international peacekeeping headquarters. These missions, as legislated under law are to "play its designated role in the actual upholding of the rule of law and to provide assistance to those in need thereof, as well as to contribute to the effectiveness of the armed forces." The Royal Marechaussee has participated in ten UN missions since 1950. This group is currently supporting UN operations in the former Yugoslavia and will generally provide forces to participate in peace operations when requested. The Royal Marechaussee has attained international respect due to its effective performance in peace operations. The balance achieved between military outlook and police skills could provide an effective model for US Military forces in developing an optimal force to participate in future peace operations.

The primary task of the U.S. Armed Forces will remain to deter conflict, but, should deterrence fail, to fight and win our nation's wars. However, concurrently the U.S. will be called upon to participate in operations other than war in the pursuit of this nation's interests. The challenge for the United States is to achieve a force structure which will provide a balance between maintaining the nation's war fighting capability and providing a force capable of achieving

international cooperation assisting in humanitarian, disaster relief and peace keeping operations. Mission, available lift, in-theater support and political factors are often the driving factors in determining the task-organization of units involved in military operations other than war. The Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) concept is conducive to organizing a force from within the existing Marine Corps force structure and tailoring it to meet the specific requirements necessary to participate in complex contingencies. The force structure required must be appropriately sized and remain flexible enough to respond to any threat across the warfighting spectrum. It must also be capable of independent and sustained operations. When combined with combat support, combat service support and other various attachments the Marine infantry regiment remains the most flexible task organization capable of adapting to the requirements of operations other than war.

The Marine infantry regiment contains a headquarters company and three infantry battalions within its current organizational structure. The battalion is the basic tactical unit with which the regiment accomplishes its mission. The headquarters company of the infantry regiment contains a regimental headquarters, a communications platoon and a reconnaissance platoon. The number of personnel assigned to the infantry regiment is roughly equal to that of the Royal Marechaussee. This size force is considered optimal in that it provides an adaptive force with a flexible response in a peacekeeping environment. The Marine infantry regiment dedicated to peace operations would retain its primary mission which is to locate, close with, and destroy the enemy by fire and maneuver, or to repel his assault by fire and close combat.

These tasks are still critical in helping win the nation's wars. However, the dedicated regiment would also possess a collateral mission which addresses participation in complex contingencies. The critical element in any force is not size, but its requisite capabilities, primarily determined by the level of training, equipment, quality of personnel and doctrine of the organization.

Since the principle purpose of the U.S. military is to fight and win the nation's wars the dedicated 'constabulary' regiment must first and foremost master basic conventional combat tasks. However, commensurate with peace operations certain additional tasks should be mastered before operating in such an environment. Tasks associated with operating in this environment are not necessarily unique and specific to peace operations, but it is important to recognize that the tasks encountered may be quite different than those encountered in a conventional combat environment. For instance, troops involved in complex contingencies should receive more passive and defensive training than their conventional combat counterparts. The role may be likened to civilian law enforcement responding to a civil disturbance or domestic quarrel, where negotiation and arbitration may be the preferred method of settling the dispute or argument.²⁹ In addition, minimizing the risk of casualties and reducing the collateral damage may be key factors in gauging the level of success in peace operations. Regardless, leaders must develop specific mission essential task lists (METLs) that identify those tasks which will require more specialized training for participation in peace operations. Historically, in these types of operations little or no advanced training is done until after a crisis develops. This trend must be reversed since these same forces expected to

operate in complex contingencies may be tasked to help train rudimentary public security or constabulary forces maintain public order once U.S. military forces depart.

Marines assigned to this dedicated regiment will be well armed, combat trained Marines who will be proficient in specific skills requisite with the environment they will be operating in. At a minimum personnel must be proficient in basic infantry skills to include squad and platoon level offensive and defensive tactics, patrolling and employment of crew served weapons. Training in civilian law enforcement procedures will also be essential in conducting security operations. Specific METLs must address the tasks which will be required. These are: enhanced marksmanship training; escort and guarding of convoys; area and route reconnaissance; manning of roadblocks and checkpoints; vehicle searches; fixed and roving posts; self protection in static positions; cordon and search procedures; seizure of buildings; riot control; and training in the employment of less than lethal technology. Members must also be capable of collecting 'evidence' for possible use in cases involving war crimes and crimes against humanity. Collection of human intelligence (HUMINT) will become paramount in complex contingencies. Successfully accomplishing the latter will require a heightened cultural awareness of the country/geographical area the unit will be operating in. It is critical that the security presence does not alienate the civilian population. Once the training tasks have been identified, standards must be trained to and appropriate equipment must be procured to support that training and to sustain the force. Determining the right 'tools' for the job at hand is at times a difficult process to

say the least. Combat weapon systems time tested in mid and high intensity conflict may not be the weapons of choice required for the environment specific to peace operations. Protecting the force, minimizing casualties, reducing collateral damage to civilian infrastructure are just a couple of issues driving the research and development, and procurement decisions today. Development of systems which address these considerations should be aggressively pursued as the political and economic stakes escalate when countries participate in peace operations. When tactical actions can have immediate strategic impact, there is little room for margin of error. This coupled with the CNN effect does not allow a dress rehearsal in which troops can 'reshoot' a 'scene'. Success increasingly depends on well trained, disciplined troops who possess weapon systems and equipment tailored for the job at hand. Anything short of this ideal invites disaster.

Complex contingencies will likely cause major upheavals in affected societies, causing disintegrating public order in urban environments. Highly lethal and destructive firepower may become an anachronism in these types of environments. Less than lethal technology may be the weapon of choice. What is imperative here is that the commander have a wide range of options to select from. Civilian off the shelf technology readily exists which could greatly aid the peacekeeper in executing his mission. Effective hand held communications and location systems capable of operating in the urban environment are critical to the peacekeeper. Advanced surveillance equipment would also provide utility to the peacekeeper. Light tactical vehicles such as the NYALA and CASSPIR series manufactured by General Motors have been in service with

South African and UN forces for years and have proved invaluable in meeting the increasing hazards of modern peacekeeping and law enforcement roles. There exists a plethora of equipment which would better enable the peacekeeper to better perform his mission.

The two missing variables are appropriate funding and commitment to the peacekeeping mission. All too often it is the active component of the U.S. military that is called upon to participate in peace operations. However, if one seriously scrutinizes the decision for selecting the force one might be surprised at the rationale used to determine the make up of the intervention force. Instead of deploying a force in peace operations which possesses specialized skills based on that particular scenario, the mission is often given to the force which at the time is most available and least politically disruptive. This could be construed as indicative of an Administration and defense establishment that has given peace operations a low priority in terms of national interest. For many in the active component of the armed forces, successive deployments are beginning to affect their quality of life. Long deployments away from home with little respite are helping to erode morale. It has been reported that retention rates are adversely affected as well. A recommendation to remedy the adverse impact of a high operational and personnel tempo on the active component would be to exercise greater integration of the Active and Reserve forces when conducting peace operations.

The mission of the Marine Forces Reserve is to augment and reinforce the active component. Designating a specific regiment within the Selected Marine Corps Reserve and organizing, training and equipping the regiment

accordingly, will vastly improve U.S. force participation in peace operations. Historically, the Marine Reserve has provided support to civilian law enforcement agencies in counter drug operations. In 1996, approximately 1,560 Marine Reservists provided 39,062 mandays of support in these types of operations.³⁰ Reserve participation in peace operations could be better facilitated by including major reserve subordinate commands in the planning coordination of its units with Active component commands in operational war plans as well as the increased integration of Reserve staffs and exercises. The Marine Corps reserve maintain a "train as we fight" philosophy.³¹ As long as the Reserve component remain mission capable more reliance should be placed on them. The Reserve component is truly a cost effective and capable alternative to deploying Active component troops in peace operations.

The 'three block war' as envisioned by the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Charles Krulak may provide a realistic snapshot of the future challenge facing the United States in the 21st century. Complex contingencies will be an inherent element of this future construct and the United States must be prepared to confront these challenges if the nation is to remain competitive in the economic, military and political arenas. Disaster relief and peacekeeping operations are presently occurring in the world, however, if the scope and intensity increase in the near future United States military capabilities may be stretched to the limit.

Participating in the 'three block war' will require more than just an overwhelming conventional military response. The challenge remains for the United States to organize, train and equip specific elements of the current force

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The 'three block war' as envisioned by the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Charles Krulak may provide a realistic snapshot of the future challenge facing the United States in the 21st century. Complex contingencies will be an inherent element of this future construct and the United States must be prepared to confront these challenges if the nation is to remain competitive in the economic, military and political arenas. Disaster relief and peacekeeping operations are presently occurring in the world, however, if the scope and intensity increase in the near future United States military capabilities may be stretched to the limit.

Participating in the 'three block war' will require more than just an overwhelming conventional military response. The challenge remains for the United States to organize, train and equip specific elements of the current force

structure to effectively manage these potential threats. The 'three block war' scenario will require the United States to maintain a military force structure which is both adaptive and flexible. The future force mix must remain agile and capable of adjusting to a volatile and hostile environment. Achieving this capability would entail the establishment of a third force in the nation's arsenal. This force would be based on the police constabulary concept. Designating a Marine Reserve Regiment from the Marine Total Force, and training, organizing and equipping this regiment to operate effectively as a police constabulary would give the nation a unique capability, the ability to maneuver and operate in a sea of instability and chaos.

NOTES

1. General Charles C. Krulak USMC, lecture presented at the National Press Club, Washington DC, 10 October 1997.

2. General Krulak lecture to National Press Club.

3. The term complex contingency is synonymous with Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW).

4. Andrew S. Natsios, *U.S. Foreign Policy And The Four Horsemen Of The Apocalypse: Humanitarian Relief in Complex Emergencies* (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1997), 113.

5. Natsios, 112.

6. LtCol R.A. Estilow USMC, "U.S. Military Force and Operations Other Than War: Necessary Questions to Avoid Strategic Failure", in *The Maxwell Papers*, Maxwell Paper No. 3 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air War College, 1996), 11.

7. Natsios, 7- 8.

8. General Krulak lecture to National Press Club.

9. Natsios, 114.

10. General Krulak lecture to National Press Club.

11. Charles C. Moskos, Jr., *Peace Soldiers* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976) 4.

12. Moskos, 2 - 3.

13. Moskos, 8 - 9.

14. Moskos, 132.

15. Moskos, 12.

16. Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier* (New York: The Free Press, 1960) 419.

17. Cohn F. W. Smith, *The Development Of British Counter Terrorist Strategy: The Role Of The Police And The Military*, Masters Thesis (United Kingdom: The University of Reading, 2 July 1994), 159.

18. Moskos, 131.
19. Smith, 159.
20. Natsios, 115.
21. William F. Perry, "Defense in an Age of Hope", *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 75, No. 6 (New York: David Kellogg Publisher, Nov/Dec 1996), 65.
22. The Right Honourable Peter Brooke, MP, "Politicians, Soldiers and the Place of the Security Forces", *RUSI Journal* Vol. 137, No. 2 (April 1992), 2.
23. Smith, 29.
24. Smith, 14.
25. Smith, 41.
26. John Newsinger, "From Counter-Insurgency to Internal Security: Northern Ireland 1969 - 1992", *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Spring 1995) 88 - 111.
27. Natsios, 117.
28. Moskos, 52 - 53.
29. William J. Durch and J. Mathew Vaccara, "The Environment and Tasks of Peace Operations," in *Peace Operations; Developing An American Strategy*, ed. Antonia H. Chayes and George T. Raach (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1995), 32.
30. OSD, "Reserve Component Programs: Fiscal Year 1996 Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board", March 1997 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1997), 9.
31. Ibid., 10.

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